Let us start with a peculiar reading by Varela and colleagues of the Cartesian/rationalistic tradition: “It is because reflection in our culture has been severed from its bodily life that the mind-body problem has become a topic for abstract reflection. Cartesian dualism is not so much one competing solution as it is the formulation of this problem” (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991, 30). As a formulation of the question of the relations among mind, body, and experience, it is partial at best. A clear example of the shortcomings of this approach is the standard conceptualization of cognition as the representation by a discrete mind of a preexisting, separate world (cognition as the manipulation of symbols). For Varela and colleagues, this is fundamentally mistaken; for them, rather than “the representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind,” cognition is “the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs” (9). When you think about it, it makes perfect sense: mind is not separate from body, and both are not separate from the world, that is, from the ceaseless and alwayschanging flow of existence that constitutes life (or can you really separate them out?). By positing the notion of cognition as representation, we are all cut off from the stream of life in which we are ineluctably and immediately immersed as living beings. They call this view cognition as enaction (embodied action). It is based on the assumption of the fundamental unity of being and world, of our inevitable thrownness into the world (or throwntogetherness, to use geographer Doreen Massey’s [2004] wonderful neologism).2 It also assumes that the primary condition of existence is embodied presence, a dwelling in the world (see also Ingold 2000, 2011). By linking cognition to experience, our authors lead us into an altogether different tradition. In this tradition we recognize in a profound way that “the world is not something that is given to us but something we engage in by moving, touching, breathing, eating” (Varela 1999, 8).