One speculation is that social disabilities in people, such as autism spectrum disorder, trauma-related social difficulties, and some aspects of schizophrenia, may be partly related to incomplete self-models interfering with a person’s ability to resonate with others

[[2407.10188v2.pdf#page=2&selection=15,38,20,17|2407.10188v2, page 2]]

contrast:

==We do not relate to things primarily through having representations of them.== Connected to both of the preceding points is Heidegger‘s rejection of mental representations. The common sense of our tradition is that in order to perceive and relate to things, we must have some content in our minds that corresponds to our knowledge of them. If we focus on concernful activity instead of on detached contemplation, the status of this representation is called into question. In driving a nail with a hammer (as opposed to thinking about a hammer), I need not make use of any explicit representation of the hammer. My ability to act comes from my familiarity with hammering, not my knowledge of a hammer. Understanding Computers and Cognition

But I guess an important question here is to what degree is a ‘model’ the same as a ‘representation’? Is a model ‘theoretical’, the object of ‘detached reflection’? We know that it’s not, cognition is embodied